Graced by Nature's Grace
Studying Leo Strauss' What Is Political Philosophy?
Building upon my previous post and introduction to this “Athen’s Flame” category of my Substack The Torch, it makes sense to begin with Leo Strauss’ simple question: What is political philosophy?
Strauss answers this simple question in the first chapter of his book What Is Political Philosophy?
I recommend the first chapter of What Is Political Philosophy?, a chapter that is appropriately entitled (like the title of my Facebook group) “What Is Political Philosophy?”
Rather than summarize the first chapter or attempt to explain Strauss’ answer to this question, allow me to extract and comment upon just one beautiful comment from the Strauss’ conclusion to the second section, “The Classical Solution”:
Men are constantly attracted and deluded by two opposite charms: the charm of competence which is engendered by mathematics and everything akin to mathematics, and the charm of humble awe, which is engendered by meditation on the human soul and its experiences. Philosophy is characterized by the gentle, if firm, refusal to succumb to either charm. It is the highest form of the mating of courage and moderation. In spite of its highness or nobility, it could appear as Sisyphean or ugly, when one contrasts its achievement with its goal. Yet it is necessarily accompanied, sustained and elevated by eros. It is graced by nature’s grace. (p. 40)
How did Strauss arrive at such a beautiful and elegant description of philosophy?
Is Eros nature’s grace?
We might pair Strauss’ statement with St. Thomas Aquinas’ observation that “Gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit” (“Grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it.”) Taken together, Strauss’ description of philosophy and Aquinas’ description of grace might render the following apothegm: Grace does not destroy eros (nature’s grace), but perfects it.
In contemplating the foregoing, one is reminded of Pascal’s fragment “Différence entre l’esprit de géométrie et l’esprit de finesse”.
But even if - as Strauss seems to recommend - I gently but firmly refuse to succumb to the latter or to the former charms (the charm of competence or the charm of humble awe), and even if I gently but firmly refuse to succumb to the charm of Pascal’s magnificent description of the difference between the spirit of geometry and the spirit of finesse, I still wonder what it means that philosophy is necessarily accompanied, sustained and elevated by eros? Why is philosophy graced by nature’s grace? What is nature’s grace? Let’s proceed to find out.
In Strauss’ second chapter of What Is Political Philosophy? he pulverizes historicism and persuasively argues that the revitalization of classical political philosophy is necessary, especially in light of the character of modern political philosophy. By such persuasive arguments, Strauss kindles excitement in the possibility of the revitalization of classical political philosophy, which revitalization he in stimulates in the third chapter of What Is Political Philosophy? "On Classical Political Philosophy."
Again, rather than summarize or attempt to explain Strauss’ third chapter, allow me to extract and comment upon several of its gems before we move on to chapter four:
"It was only after the classical philosophers had done their work that political philosophy became definitely 'established' and thus acquired a certain remoteness from political life." (p. 78)
Remoteness from political life, therefore, was, unlike the work of modern philosophers, remote from the work of the classical philosophers.
"The most striking difference between classical political philosophy and present-day political science is that the latter is no longer concerned at all with what was the guiding question of the former: the question of the best political order." (p. 79)
Is the question of the best political order, arising directly from political life, therefore a perennial question?
"The primary questions of classical political philosophy, and the terms in which it stated them, were not specifically philosophic or scientific; they were questions that are raised in assemblies, councils, clubs and cabinets, and they were stated in terms intelligible and familiar, at least to all sane adults, from everyday experience and everyday usage." (p. 80)
Is there a modern equivalent to classical assemblies, councils, clubs, and cabinets in what Tocqueville called American townships, or whatever we might call a township now, such as a neighborhood? Is this where we can still find the primary questions?
"The political philosopher first comes into sight as a good citizen who can perform this function of the good citizen in the best way and on the highest level. In order to perform his function he has to raise ulterior questions, questions that are never raised in the political arena; but in doing so he does not abandon his fundamental orientation, which is the orientation inherent in political life." (p. 81)
This seems crucial to me. The ulterior questions that the good citizen or political philosopher raises arise from and perhaps even have the potential to enhance political life. How can the political philosopher, the good citizen, still raise such ulterior questions without abandoning his fundamental orientation which is inherent in political life? Why does the good citizen or political philosopher not abandon his fundamental orientation inherent in political life while raising such ulterior questions?
"A man who possesses 'political science' is not merely able to deal properly with a large variety of situations in his own community; he can, in principle, manage well even the affairs of any other political community, be it 'Greek' or 'Barbarian.'" (p. 82)
Can a man possess ‘political science’ today? Why or why not?
"Classical political philosophy rejected the identification of political science with rhetoric; it held that rhetoric, at its best, was only an instrument of political science." (p. 83)
This makes sense, although there is certainly a lot to unpack from this sentence.
"Classical political philosophy was related to political life directly, because its guiding subject was a subject of actual political controversy carried on in pre-philosophic political life. Since all political controversies presuppose the existence of the political community, the classics are not primarily concerned with the question of whether and why there is, or should be, a political community; hence the question of the nature and purpose of the political community is not the guiding question for classical political philosophy." (p. 84)
Pre-philosophic political life, therefore, appears to be an incontrovertible reality. To question it appears to be more of a preoccupation of modern political philosophy. What, then, was the classics primary concern? Let’s find out.
"The immediate concern of that controversy is the best political order for the given political community, but every answer to that immediate question implies an answer to the universal question of the best political order as such. It does not require the exertions of philosophers to lay bare this implication, for the political controversy has a natural tendency to express itself in universal terms." (p. 85)
What is the best political order for our community? What is the best political order simply?
"What is to be understood by 'good men' was known also from political life: good men are those who are willing, and able, to prefer the common interest to their private interest and to the objects of their passions, or those who, being able to discern in each situation what is the noble or right thing to do, do it because it is noble and right and for no ulterior reason. It was also generally recognized that this answer gives rise to further questions of almost overwhelming political significance: that results which are generally considered desirable can be achieved by men of dubious character or by the use of unfair means; that 'just' and 'useful' are not simply identical; that virtue may lead to ruin." (p. 86)
With so many who profess to prefer the common interest to their private interest and to the objects of their passions, how can we discern who the good men are who not only profess but truly embody or embrace such a preference? Discerning what is the noble or right thing to do in each situation must be a necessary prerequisite to doing the noble or right thing because it is noble and right, and perhaps we improve in this discernment by consistently doing the noble or right thing because it is noble and right. A lot depends, therefore, upon discerning the noble and right and in acting in accordance with the noble and right. Those who reveal to us the beauty of the noble and right do us a great service. Perhaps the noble and the beautiful are the same thing (Kalon).
"Thus the question guiding classical political philosophy, the typical answer that it gave, and the insight into the bearing of the formidable objections to it, belong to pre-philosophic political life, or precede political philosophy. Political philosophy goes beyond pre-philosophic political knowledge by trying to understand fully the implications of these pre-philosophic insights, and especially by defending the second of them against the more or less 'sophisticated' attacks made by bad or perplexed men." (p. 86)
Are the pre-philosophic insights superior to political philosophy’s making explicit and elucidating these pre-philosophic insights? Is there a sense in which that which precedes political philosophy is superior to political philosophy? I think that Strauss would say “no,” and that there is a difference between classical political philosophy’s efforts to understand things as they really are and modern political philosophy’s efforts to do the same. What do you think?
"By the best political order the classical philosopher understood that political order which is best always and everywhere." (p. 87)
Which political order is best always and everywhere?
"But it does mean that the goodness of the political order realized anywhere and at any time can be judged only in terms of that political order which is best absolutely." (p. 87)
Which political order is best absolutely? Did Plato and Aristotle definitively discover the best political order as such? Or might it be possible to judge Plato’s or Aristotle’s best regime by means of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America or Publius’ Federalist Papers?
"Because of its direct relation to political life classical political philosophy was essentially 'practical'; on the other hand, it is no accident that modern political philosophy frequently calls itself political 'theory.' The primary concern of the former was not the description, or understanding, of political life, but its right guidance. Hegel's demand that political philosophy refrain from constructing a state as it ought to be, or from teaching the state how it should be, and that it try to understand the present and actual state as something essentially rational, amounts to a rejection of the raison d'être of classical political philosophy..." (p. 88)
Can the right guidance of modern political life become the primary concern without some efforts to describe and understand modern political life? Or are those two things inextricably linked? Or is it simply inevitable that political philosophy must focus on the right guidance of political life in order to truly understand political life?
... "[paragraph continued]... In contrast with present-day political science, classical political philosophy pursued practical aims and was guided by, and culminated in, 'value judgments.' The attempt to replace the quest for the best political order by a purely descriptive or analytical political science which refrains from 'value judgments' is, from the point of view of the classics, as absurd as the attempt to replace the art of making shoes, that is, good and well-fitting shoes, by a museum of shoes made by apprentices, or as the idea of a medicine which refuses to distinguish between health and sickness." (p. 89)
Thus the quest for the best political order continues…
"The political teaching of the classical philosophers, as distinguished from their theoretical teaching, was primarily addressed not to all intelligent men, but to all decent men." (p. 89)
Ah.
Doesn’t true intelligence depend greatly upon decency? Doesn’t the theoretical teaching therefore depend greatly upon the political teaching? Of course I’m interested in the theoretical teaching of the classical philosophers. I suppose that it is possible to understand both the political teaching and the theoretical teaching, and that understanding the political teaching is a prerequisite to understanding the theoretical teaching. What do you think?
"Thus the attitude of classical political philosophy toward political things was always akin to that of the enlightened statesman; it was not the attitude of the detached observer who looks at political things in the way in which a zoologist looks at the big fishes swallowing the small ones, or that of the social 'engineer' who thinks in terms of manipulating or conditioning rather than in terms of education or liberation, or that of the prophet who believes that he knows the future." (p. 90)
Strauss lumps a zoologist, the social ‘engineer,’ and the prophet who believes that he knows the future into the same category of detached observers and juxtaposes these to the enlightened statesman… but is this fair to prophets? What kind of prophet does Strauss have in mind? This isn’t a dig against the Hebrew prophets, is it? Perhaps Strauss means the kind of prophets that were prominent in ancient Greece… I don’t know.
Might not a prophet who not only believes that he knows the future but actually knows the future be superior to the enlightened statesman as well as superior to a zoologist or the social ‘engineer’? Some prophets are statesmen, and some statesmen have been almost prophetic in their declarations. I have nothing against zoologists either, as long as they stick to zoology. But social “engineers” irritate me.
"In brief, the root of classical political philosophy was the fact that political life is characterized by controversies between groups struggling for power within the political community." (p. 90)
Has political life changed?
"In order to perform his function the philosopher had to raise an ulterior question which is never raised in the political arena. That question is so simple, elementary and unobtrusive that it is, at first, not even intelligible, as is shown by a number of occurrences described in Platonic dialogues. The distinctively philosophic question is 'What is virtue?' What is that virtue whose possession - as everyone admits spontaneously or is reduced to silence by unanswerable arguments - gives a man the highest right to rule? In light of this question the common opinions about virtue appear at the outset as unconscious attempts to answer an unconscious question. On closer inspection their radical insufficiency is more specifically revealed by the fact that some of them are contradicted by other opinions which are equally common. To reach consistency the philosopher is compelled to maintain one part of common opinion and to give up the other part which contradicts it; he is thus driven to adopt a view that is no longer generally held, a truly paradoxical view, one that is generally considered 'absurd' or 'ridiculous.'" (pp. 90-91)
Ah.
What is virtue?
What is that virtue whose possession gives a man the highest right to rule?
"Nor is that all. He is ultimately compelled to transcend not merely the dimension of common opinion, of political opinion, but the dimension of political life as such; for he is led to realize that the ultimate aim of political life cannot be reached by political life, but only by a life devoted to contemplation, to philosophy. This finding is of crucial importance for political philosophy, since it determines the limits set to political life, to all political action and all political planning. Moreover, it implies that the highest subject of political philosophy is the philosophic life: philosophy - not as a teaching or a body of knowledge, but as a way of life - offers, as it were, the solution to the problem that keeps political life in motion. Ultimately, political philosophy transforms itself into a discipline that is no longer concerned with political things in the ordinary sense of the term: Socrates called his inquiries a quest for 'the TRUE political skill,' and Aristotle called his discussion of virtue and related subjects 'a KIND of political science.'" (p. 91)
Ah.
Is philosophy the ultimate aim of political life? Is the philosophic way of life therefore the most practical way of life? What is the TRUE political skill?
"No difference between classical political philosophy and modern political philosophy is more telling than this: the philosophic life, or the life of 'the wise,' which was the highest subject of classical political philosophy, has in modern times almost completely ceased to be a subject of political philosophy. Yet even in this ultimate step of classical political philosophy, however absurd it seemed to the common opinion, was nevertheless 'divined' by pre-philosophic political life: men wholly devoted to the political life were sometimes popularly considered 'busybodies,' and their unresting habits were contrasted with the greater freedom and the higher dignity of the more retired life of men who were 'minding their own business.'" (p. 91)
How did pre-philosophic life ‘divine’ the highest subject of classical political philosophy?
“Philosophy, therefore, was at first exclusively concerned with the natural things. Thus, in the beginning, philosophic effort was concerned only negatively, only accidentally, with political things. Socrates himself, the founder of political philosophy, was famous as a philosopher before he ever turned to political philosophy. Left to themselves, the philosophers would not descend again to the ‘cave’ of political life, but would remain outside in what they considered ‘the island of the blessed’ - contemplation of the truth.” (p. 92)
What changed? Why was philosophy turned from natural things to political things?
“But philosophy, being an attempt to rise from opinion to science, is necessarily related to the sphere of opinion as its essential starting point, and hence to the political sphere. Therefore the political sphere is bound to advance into the focus of philosophic interest as soon as philosophy starts to reflect on its own doings. To understand fully its own purpose and nature, philosophy has to understand its essential starting point, and hence the nature of political things.” (p. 92)
“Therefore the political sphere is bound to advance into the focus of philosophic interest as soon as philosophy starts to reflect on its own doings.” This is how things changed. Why is the sphere of opinion the essential starting point of philosophy? What is the nature and purpose of philosophy? How does philosophy come to understand its essential starting point, and hence the nature of political things?
“The philosophers, as well as other men who have become aware of the possibility of philosophy, are sooner or later driven to wonder, ‘Why philosophy?’ Why does human life need philosophy, why is it good, why is it right, that opinions about the nature of the whole should be replaced by genuine knowledge of the nature of the whole? Since human life is living together or, more exactly, is political life, the question ‘Why philosophy"?’ means ‘Why does political life need philosophy?’ This question calls philosophy before the tribunal of the political community: it makes philosophy politically responsible.” (pp. 92-93)
Ah.
Why does human life need philosophy? Why is philosophy good? Why is it right that opinions about the nature of the whole should be replaced by genuine knowledge of the nature of the whole? Why does political life need philosophy? Why must philosophy be politically responsible?
“To justify philosophy before the tribunal of the political community means to justify philosophy in terms of the political community, that is to say, by means of a kind of argument which appeals not to philosophers as such, but to citizens as such. To prove to citizens that philosophy is permissible, desirable or even necessary, the philosopher has to follow the example of Odysseus and start from premises that are generally agreed upon, or from generally accepted opinions: he has to argue ad hominem or ‘dialectically.’ From this point of view, I say, ‘political philosophy’ designates not so much a subject matter as a manner of treatment; from this point of view, I say, ‘political philosophy’ means primarily not the philosophic treatment of politics, but the political, or popular, treatment of philosophy, or the political introduction to philosophy - the attempt to lead the qualified citizens, or rather their qualified sons, from the political life to the philosophic life. This deeper meaning of ‘political philosophy’ tallies well with its ordinary meaning, for in both cases ‘political philosophy’ culminates in praise of the philosophic life. At any rate, it is ultimately because he means to justify philosophy before the tribunal of the political community, and hence on the level of political discussion, that the philosopher has to understand the political things exactly as they are understood in political life.” (p. 94)
Notice how Strauss employs the phrase “I say” … something that reminds me of Machiavelli’s frequent use of the same phrase “Io dico.” “I say, ‘political philosophy’ means primarily not the philosophic treatment of politics, but the political, or popular, treatment of philosophy, or the political introduction to philosophy.” Why does the political or popular treatment of philosophy or the political introduction to philosophy matter so much? Why is this political or popular treatment of philosophy primarily political philosophy? Why must the philosopher justify philosophy before the tribunal of the political community? Why must the philosopher understand the political things exactly as they are understood in political life?
Why does Strauss mention the attempt to lead not just qualified citizens, but their sons, from the political life to the philosophic life? Why do both meanings of political philosophy culminate in praise of the philosophic life?
“In his political philosophy the philosopher starts, then, from that understanding of political things which is natural to pre-philosophic political life.” (p. 94)
Ah.
Then how do we arrive at that understanding of political things which is natural to pre-philosophic political life long after the end of pre-philosophic political life? Is there any remaining pre-philosophic political life or does this very question indicate that we only have post-philosophic political life with which to work?
“At the beginning the fact that a certain way of acting is generally praised, is a sufficient reason for considering that attitude, or that way of acting, a virtue. But the philosopher is soon compelled, or able, to transcend the dimension of pre-philosophic understanding by raising the crucial question ‘What is virtue?’ The attempt to answer this question leads to a critical distinction between the generally praised attitudes which are rightly praised, and those which are not; and it leads to the recognition of a certain hierarchy, unknown in pre-philosophic life, of the different virtues. Such a philosophic critique of the generally accepted views is at the bottom of the fact that Aristotle, for example, omitted piety and sense of shame from his list of virtues, and that his list starts with courage and moderation (the least intellectual virtues) and, proceeding via liberality, magnanimity and the virtues of private relations, to justice, culminates in the dianoetic virtues. Moreover, insight into the limits of the moral-political sphere as a whole can be expounded fully only by answering the question of the nature of political things. This question marks the limit of political philosophy as a practical discipline: while essentially practical in itself, the question functions as an entering wedge for others whose purpose is no longer to guide action but simply to understand things as they are.” (p. 94)
What are the dianoetic virtues and how do they differ from other virtues? Why did Aristotle start his list of virtues with courage and moderation? Why are courage and moderation the least intellectual virtues?
What is the nature of political things?
Don’t the purposes of guiding action and understanding things as they are go hand in hand? What is the true relationship between guiding action and simply understanding things as they are?
Discuss.
Chapter four of What Is Political Philosophy? is a “Restatement on Xenophon’s Hiero.”